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Studies of organizational interdependence distinguish between two contrasting phenomena: 
symbiosis and exploitation. These are often discussed separately, as if they were isolated 
patterns. Such dichotomy is clearly evident in the sports field, where scholars often 
emphasize either cooperation and symbiosis or competition and exploitation when studying 
the relationships of sports organizations with their environment. I argue here that this 
binary misses the delicate intricacy of organizational interdependencies. While most 
organizational relations exhibit forms of symbiosis and exploitation, these are not exclusive 
patterns. Rather, symbiotic cooperation and opportunistic exploitation exist side by side in 
organizational alliances. Furthermore, these are dynamic patterns, sensitive to changes in 
the organization’s environmental context. This proposition is demonstrated through a case 
study of the long-lasting alliance between Maccabi Tel-Aviv basketball club and the Israeli 
Public Channel. This alliance has been characterized by ongoing cooperation and symbiotic 
rent, but also by altering exploitive behaviors. At different times both organizations used 
their structural advantages to attain exploitive rents at the expense of the other side.     
The literature on organizational interdependence has a long tradition, going back to the 
early 1950s (e.g. Hawley 1950; Katz & Kahn 1966; Aiken & Hage 1968; Pfeffer 1972; Hannan 
& Freeman 1988; Gulati & Singh 1998). Scholars of organizational relations often distinguish 
between two prominent and contrasting phenomena: Symbiosis (e.g. Pfeffer & Nowak 1976; 
Hannan & Freeman 1977; Deutsch 1980; Koka & Prescott 2000) and exploitation (e.g. Burt 
1992; Larson et al. 1998; Sorenson 2000; Das et al. 2003). Dyadic symbiotic interdependence 
occurs when two individuals or organizations cooperate in order to achieve desired goals. 
This symbiosis leads to what Marshall (1949 [1920]) had termed composite rent—the gains 
resulting from cooperation in excess to the returns in a non-cooperative situation. In 
exploitive relations actors take advantage of their structural social position to maximize 
returns at the expense of another party. I will refer to such gains here as exploitive rent.  
The current paper wishes to break a common dichotomy in organizational literature 
between cooperation and exploitation. Building on the ideas of Barnett and Carroll (1987) I 
argue that these two practices are rarely (if ever) exclusive. Rather, they tend to exist side by 
side in organizational interrelations. Cooperation, trust, and the perception of mutual gains 
www.intechopen.com
 
Sociological Landscape – Theories, Realities and Trends 
 
342 
are necessary components of organizational interdependencies. Indeed, as myriad studies 
have shown, without these elements strategic alliances fall apart quite abruptly (e.g. Gulati 
1995; Uzzi 1997; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Zaheer et al. 1998; Putnam 2000; Whipple & 
Frankel 2000). However, alongside cooperation and trust, most dyadic alliances are also 
characterized by elements of opportunistic exploitation. Since alliances are rarely 
egalitarian, there is an imbalance of power, where one side holds greater power than the 
other. This power position will most likely be used to acquire excess returns at the expense 
of the other side. Nevertheless, an alliance may still be preserved as long as the exploited 
organization perceives the returns it derives from it as exceeding the returns it would have 
achieved without it. 
Furthermore, I suggest that the nexus of exploitation and cooperation is mostly fluid, 
volatile and dynamic, rather than stable or fixed. There is a delicate balance between 
enjoying synergetic symbiosis and taking advantage of the other side. This balance quite 
often changes over different settings and time periods, depending on the environmental 
context. Changes in the organizational environment can take the form of a cut off in 
governmental support, the establishment or elimination of a monopolistic status, the 
introduction of new competing organizations into the market, changes in the availability of 
raw materials, changes in market demand, and more. Such turnabouts may lead to a change 
in the balance of powers between interdependent organizations. While at times such 
changes lead to the disintegration of the alliance, the alliance may also be preserved, but 
with the formerly exploited side now becoming the exploiter. Such changes illustrate that 
Power is not a fixed part of the social structure, but rather a volatile ongoing social 
relationship, which is sensitive to transformations in the environmental context. 
The divide between symbiosis and exploitation is clearly evident in research on 
organizational interdependence in the field of sports. Most studies of the field emphasize 
the symbiosis and composite rents derived from cooperation between sports organizations, 
sponsors, the media, and other social actors (e.g. McChesney 1989; Koppett 1994; Williams 
1994). Others stress mainly the exploitation involved in these relationships (e.g. Hargreaves 
1986; Quirk & Rodney 1999). The current study, however, demonstrates that in the sports 
arena, much like in other environments, dyadic organizational interdependencies often 
incorporate elements of symbiosis and exploitation. 
This contention is illustrated by an Israeli case study of interdependence between a 
basketball club and a television channel. For almost forty years Maccabi Tel-Aviv basketball 
club and the Public Israeli Channel (Channel 1) maintained an alliance, in which the latter 
held the franchise for the broadcasting of the teams’ matches in the European arena. 
Throughout this period both sides enjoyed an evident composite rent. For the team the 
broadcastings served at first as leverage for exposure, which promoted the acquisition of 
national audience support. Later on, the broadcastings also became a major source of 
income, as broadcasting franchise royalties increased dramatically. For the public television 
channel the matches served as a primal source of ratings and as a tool to retain legitimacy in 
an expanding television market. 
Yet, throughout the years, dimensions of exploitation were also clearly present in the 
alliance. First, until the early 1990s, it was the Public Channel which used its monopoly in 
the Israeli television market to avoid almost completely any financial compensation for the 
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broadcastings franchise. Following the ingress of other television channels into the market, 
at the beginning of the 1990s, the tables have turned. Maccabi Tel-Aviv began to employ its 
rising market power and the Public Channel’s growing dependence to demand and receive 
massive financial royalties from the channel, regardless of the latter’s increasing financial 
stringency. 
The current chapter begins with a theoretical analysis of organizational dependence and 
interdependence, concentrating on patterns of symbiosis and trust on the one hand, and 
power and exploitation on the other. This is followed by a short review of these contrasting 
patterns in the interdependent relations between sports and media organizations. Next, I 
introduce briefly the historical setting of the two organizations that stand in the focus of the 
paper—Maccabi Tel-Aviv Basketball Club and the Israeli Public Channel. The long-lasting 
alliance between these two organizations and their changing interdependence comprise the 
core part of the paper. Finally, I situate the Israeli case in the wider context of 
interdependence in the sports field and examine other examples for the interlocking of 
symbiosis and exploitation patterns. 
2. Organizational interdependence: Symbiosis and exploitation 
The term organizational dependence is often used to describe the gap between the vital 
resources a given organization has and the vital resources it needs (Samuel 2002). Hence, the 
term draws our attention to the limitations of organizations: their necessity to consider the 
demands of other organizations in their environment and to adjust some of their operations 
accordingly. According to the ecological school in organizations studies, organizational 
dependence is better described and understood as interdependence. Organizations, while 
being influenced by their environments, also influence and shape these environments 
(Hannan & Freeman 1977). 
When examining these interrelations many have stressed the positive consequences for 
those involved (Barnett and Carroll 1987; Hannan & Freeman 1988; Pfeffer & Nowak 1976). 
These scholars term the beneficial cooperation between organizations Symbiotic 
Organizational Interdependence: interdependence which emerges when organizations perceive 
their own goals as positively correlated with the goals of other organizations. This 
perception yields reciprocity and further cooperation. Each side sees the other’s success as 
facilitating its own success, and therefore is tuned towards an auxiliary orientation (Deutsch 
1980). In the ideal type symbiotic interdependence each side brings its advantages to the 
alliance and complements the other. 
Symbiotic interdependence facilitates the emergence of mutual trust: an expectation that 
others will help you when in need and that they can be counted on, because helping you 
will eventually serve their own interests, as well as your own (Coleman 1988; Deutsch 1980; 
Putnam 2000). In other words, trust is the belief that neither side is going to take advantage 
of the other; that cooperation and partnership precede individual and personal interests 
(Uzzi 1997). The development of mutual trust in a dyadic relationship allows both sides to 
take a risk and share valuable resources. Such sharing is based on the assumption that the 
other means well, which in turn facilitates further cooperation (Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). 
When trust develops, relations often exceed the professional level and reach a more personal 
and emotional level (Tjosvold 1986, 1990; Uzzi 1997). 
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As organizational cooperation and trust build up, symbiosis is fortified. It provides both 
sides with a synergetic advantage: an advantage which neither of them would have 
acquired separately. Following Marshall (1949 [1920]), Sorensen (2000) uses the term 
Composite Rent to characterize the difference between the returns of cooperative 
organizations and the returns they would have obtained in a non-cooperative situation. 
Marshall gives the example of a mill which is built on a water stream. Both the owner of the 
mill and the owner of the stream share a rent which otherwise (assuming there is no 
alternative location for the mill) would not have existed for either of them. 
Of course, not all interrelations are strictly symbiotic. Burt (1992) examines unequal 
structural opportunities (an asymmetric exchange market). He claims that, when given a 
chance, rational players (or organizations) use their structural social advantages to 
maximize their returns, even when this means taking advantage of others. Therefore, Burt 
sees rents as a ‘zero sum game’, an individual asset derived from the exploitation of others, 
i.e. an exploitive rent. Others agree that often (though not always) rents are the outcome of 
unequal structural opportunities and exploitation (Sorensen 2000).  
In this chapter I argue that when speaking of organizational interdependencies most 
relationships are neither utterly symbiotic nor purely exploitive. Rather, it is more useful to 
look at symbiosis and exploitation as the two ends of a continuum, Weberian ideal types 
rather than actual descriptions of social realities. Furthermore, the two are not binary and 
exclusive phenomena. Rarely is it possible to find sheer ongoing exploitation in inter-
organizational relations, and immaculate cooperation, it seems, is even scarcer. Following 
Barnett and Carroll (1987) I contend that elements of symbiosis and exploitation, of 
cooperation and utilization are usually found side by side in organizational 
interdependencies. Symbiosis and exploitation share an inherent tension. Interdependent 
organizations often share a composite rent, but at the same time they are likely to use 
structural advantages to acquire an exploitive rent. As social conditions change, these 
structural advantages may also disappear, and sometimes even switch sides. The once 
exploiting organization will then find itself exploited. 
3. Interdependence between sports and media organizations 
The intricate relations between sports organizations and media organizations produce an 
ideal field for the study of cooperative and exploitive rents. Current research focuses mainly 
on the cooperative and symbiotic dimensions of this relationship (e.g. Greendorfer 1983; 
Wenner 1989; Lever & Wheeler 1993; Coakley 1999; Weingerten 2003). Accordingly, media 
industries and sports teams are connected by mutual interest, convenience and need. For the 
media sport is a source of successful television programs and sales-promoting newspaper 
sections. Sports broadcasts provide television with high ratings and increased revenues 
from advertisers and pay-per-view audiences. Sports organizations on their part win 
essential exposure and royalties, and media coverage helps to increase their popularity 
(Williams 1994). Both sides depend on one another to maintain their commercial success and 
their prominent place in popular culture. Koppett (1994) describes this symbiotic 
interdependence as circular: exposure to sports events increases public interest in these 
events, which in turn increases the demand for more exposure, and so on. 
The interdependence between sports and the media is reciprocal, but it is by no means 
symmetrical. The dependence of sports organizations on the media is usually higher. 
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Newspapers and television can exist without the broadcasting of sports events, but sports in 
their current commercial form cannot survive without media financing and exposure 
(Bellamy 1999). Since the beginning of the 1970s, sports organizations in the West have 
substantially increased their revenues from selling broadcasting franchises and from 
sponsorships, while the weight of traditional revenue sources such as ticket selling and 
public financing gradually decreases (Eastman & Meyer 1989). This increased dependency 
on the media reduces sports organizations’ control over the broadcasting and coverage of 
the events they “produce” (Goldlust 1987). Sports organizations must adapt to changes in 
game schedules, the number of games, timeouts and sometimes even in the rules of the 
game (Coakley 1999). Sports leagues also attempt to promote teams that represent large 
cities with major television markets, in an attempt to increase broadcasting revenues 
(Bellamy 1989). 
While most studies emphasize media’s influence over sports, the inverse dependence is 
greater than as first meets the eye. The daily press and television owe much of their 
commercial successes to professional sports. The press has been increasingly covering sports 
events since the beginning of the twentieth century, and today most worldwide daily 
newspapers dedicate large sections to sports. In many countries the sports section is the 
most well read section of the newspapers, and studies estimate that it increases the press’ 
revenues by about 30% (Greendorfer 1983; Lever & Wheeler 1993).  
Television is the media organization most dependent on sports. Sports events comprise a 
major part of the broadcasting schedules of national and cable networks, and many of these 
networks have established television channels that broadcast sports exclusively. Television 
networks and media corporations often use sports as a broadcasting anchor; a starting point 
in their competition with other networks. They see sport broadcasts as a resource for 
attracting new viewers and retaining old ones. The high ratings of large sport events also 
make them a major source of revenues from commercial advertisement. Sports fans are 
mostly men, and advertisers wish to market commodities such as life insurance, cars, 
computers, financial institutions, credit cards, alcohol and tobacco to this audience (Coakley 
1999; Whannel 1992). The universality of sport makes it especially effective in global 
marketing. Sport talks an international language, which can be understood without the need 
for interpretations (Zuckerman 1999). 
In conclusion, there is a clear symbiotic interdependence between sport and media 
organizations. Both sides realize that the success of the other leads to their own success and 
both acquire what Sorensen (2000) calls a composite rent from the relationship. Yet, while 
most of the literature focuses on the cooperative and symbiotic dimensions of the sports and 
media nexus, the current study examines the interplay between the exploitive and the 
cooperative sides of this relationship. I will next show how these two forms of rent 
invariably coexist in relationships, and also how they may alter over time, as the context of 
cooperation changes. 
4. The case of Maccabi Tel-Aviv and the Israeli Public Channel 
As my case study I look at a long lasting alliance between Maccabi Tel-Aviv Basketball Club 
and the Israeli Public Channel (Channel 1). Since the beginning of the 1970s and up to 2007, 
the team’s European matches have been almost invariably broadcast by Channel 1. Over the 
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years, both sides shared a clear interest in the alliance, and their mutual choice served them 
both well. Yet, this long lasting relationship has been also characterized by varying patterns 
of exploitation. At different periods, both sides took advantage of their relative position in 
the television/sports market. They forced the other side to accept their terms, and 
maximized their rent on the other’s expense. To study the historical evolution of this 
interdependence I rely mainly on the archives of the three major daily Israeli newspapers: 
Yediot Ahronot, Maariv, and Haaretz, and their respective websites: ynet.co.il, nrg.co.il, and 
Haaretz.co.il. 
4.1 Maccabi Tel-Aviv basketball club 
Maccabi Tel-Aviv, the first Israeli basketball club, was formed in 1932. In 1954, when the 
Israeli basketball league was founded, Maccabi Tel-Aviv became the league’s first 
champion. Since then the team has won 48 additional championships, a degree of 
dominance that is quite rare in professional sports. The team is also very successful in the 
European arena. Since the beginning of the seventies, it has played regularly in the major 
European basketball league, and won the European championship a few times. 
Over the years, Maccabi evolved from an amateur to a professional organization. During the 
last two decades, the team’s yearly budget grew from about a million dollars at the 
beginning of the nineties to 10 million ten years later and about 20 million today. The 
organizational and managerial domains have also gone through significant changes. The 
team broke off its public and municipal support and became a private association, 
controlled by private businessmen (Haaretz, June 5, 2003). However, as is often the case 
with sports organizations that become commercialized (e.g. Enjolras 2002), the team’s public 
support remained strong. 
4.2 The Israeli Public Channel 
The Israeli television broadcasting service was established in 1963, following years of 
political opposition to its formation, and took its first broadcasting steps in 1968. It was 
formed under strict regulations concerning the broadcasts’ contents and the channel’s 
financing and political independence (Weimann 1996; Zuckerman 1999). The development 
of the Israeli television market resembles that of European television markets rather than 
that of the American one. In the United States television adopted a commercial, multi-
channel model right from the start. While the United States has a public channel, its 
standing, influence and ratings are quite marginal. In contrast, broadcastings in many 
European countries began with a monopolistic public channel. In this model the broadcasts 
are publicly funded and are motivated mainly by content demands (in most countries public 
television was defined primarily as an educating and informative tool), rather than by profit 
maximization (Zuckerman 1999).  
The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) is the classic model of public television, later 
emulated by many countries, including Israel. The BBC was established in 1922 as a 
monopolistic television and radio broadcasting channel. It retained its monopoly until 1954, 
when an additional television channel, ITV, was formed (Whannel 1992). The BBC is mostly 
financed by public toll payments. It is compelled by the law to provide information, 
education and entertainment services, and to make sure that the programs maintain high 
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standards, diversity and balance. In addition, the channel must certify a representation of 
different views of debatable political issues, and it is relatively free of direct governmental 
interference in broadcasting contents (Zuckerman 1999). The Israeli Public Channel is 
characterized by similar constraints and features. 
4.3 1970-1990: Interdependence during the monopolistic era 
During the 1970s and 1980s Channel 1 took full advantage of its monopoly in the Israeli 
television market to avoid paying for sports’ broadcasting franchises almost completely. 
Until 1976 the channel did not compensate Maccabi Tel-Aviv at all for the broadcasting of 
the team’s European matches. Between 1977 and 1985 the payment was fixed at $7000 a 
year, although Maccabi won two European titles during that period. Only in 1985 did the 
payment rise to $35,000 a year, and to about $100,000 two years later (Maariv, July 27, 2001). 
Seemingly, under such minimal compensations the team should have preferred to prevent 
the broadcastings altogether. A large portion of the team’s yearly budget was then based on 
revenues from selling tickets, and the broadcasts could have jeopardized this source of 
income. Why then did Maccabi choose to allow the broadcasts? 
The answer lies mainly in the reputational realm. The main advantage of the exclusive 
television broadcastings was in building Maccabi’s local name and providing it with an aura 
of a national team. This happened similarly to what Whannel (1992) describes in the British 
case. During its monopoly years, until the 1950s, the BBC broadcast various “national” 
events, which were connected to the state and to royal institutions. Among these were the 
soccer Cup Finals, the Derby horse race and the Wimbledon tennis tournament. 
Interestingly, some of these events received their national labeling only following their BBC 
broadcasting. In other words, the placement of these specific sports events in the channel’s 
broadcasting schedule conferred upon them with a special meaning for the British public. It 
reconstructed them as events of emotional and national significance. 
A similar process took place in Israel. The broadcasting of Maccabi Tel-Aviv’s basketball 
matches on the Public Channel began in an age when statehood was still a primary principal 
of Israeli society (Horvitz & Lisak 1990). It therefore provided the games and the team with 
an aura of statehood. The games were promoted as national events, and Maccabi became 
“the national team”. This positioning provided the team with wide public support and a 
relative advantage in its competition with the other Israeli basketball teams. Unlike the 
major sports events in Britain, which are guaranteed to take place every year, regardless of 
the participants’ identity, the European league games became a national event only when 
Maccabi Tel-Aviv participated in them. This led many to believe that there is a public 
interest in Maccabi winning the local league (a pre-condition for participation in the major 
European league at the time). And so, as Nevo (2000) notices, following the demise of the 
Israeli labor party, in the late seventies, Maccabi became the representative of the new Israeli 
center-bourgeois statehood. 
Channel 1 on its part also had a clear interest in the games becoming a national event. The 
construction of a sport match as a national event defines this match as a central and 
important event, which must be watched. The process is two-way: while fortifying the sport 
event’s status, it also reinforces the television channel’s position, as the authority with the 
power to distinguish between the “national” events and the “regular”, less important ones 
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(Whannel 1992). This reciprocity was articulated by Yoash Alroii, the manager of Channel 
1’s sports department between 1980 and 2002: “We helped in turning Maccabi into the 
national team, and they turned us into the people’s television.” (Maariv, April 28, 2004) Miki 
Berkovitz, Maccabi’s most famous player at the time, agrees: “Chanel 1 built itself through 
Maccabi, and the reputation of Maccabi was built in Chanel 1. . . . The games turned into no 
less than the national anthem.” (Ynet, April 13, 2007). This is a classic example of symbiotic 
interdependence, where both sides enjoy the alliance and profit from it.  
As discussed earlier, symbiotic interdependence often leads to the creation of trust and 
introduces an emotional dimension into the relationship. This pattern is illustrated by a 
dramatic incident, described in ‘Haaretz’ newspaper (July 22, 2003). In December 1982, prior 
to one of Maccabi’s matches in the European league, the team released a press 
announcement stating that Olsy Perry, one of the team’s American players, had the flu and 
would not be able to attend the game. Nevertheless, a reporter from Channel 1 took a 
television crew with him to Perry’s home. They were surprised to find the player in bed 
after an apparent drug overdose. However, Channel 1 managers decided to conceal the 
exclusive scoop. Instead of revealing the true occurrences of that evening the channel 
preferred to cooperate with the team’s cover-up story. 
The Perry incident was not exclusive. Dan Shilon, who was the first broadcaster of 
Maccabi’s European matches, described in an interview how Channel 1 played a role in the 
team’s success on the court. Shilon recalls the first broadcast of a game between Maccabi 
and the Belgian team Liege on November 24, 1970: 
Liege had a player named Steven Hirst, who shot remarkably from a certain spot on the 
court. At the day of the game Tal Brody [Maccabi’s former superstar] came to us and 
asked that we put a spot directly above this point. We agreed, and even changed the 
spot’s position during half time. Poor Hirst could barely score. (Maariv, April 28, 2004)    
In conclusion, during the 1970s and 1980s both Channel 1 and Maccabi Tel-Aviv enjoyed 
cooperation, which issued them both with a substantial composite rent. However, the 
interdependence in those years was by no means symmetric. During its monopolistic years 
Channel 1 enjoyed considerable structural advantages, allowing it to hold the upper hand in 
the alliance. The channel used its monopoly to almost completely avoid payments for 
broadcasting franchise. The matches received very high ratings (they were often the most 
highly watched program in the channel’s weekly schedule) and helped the Channel to 
acquire legitimacy. Still, the Channel did not feel committed to compensate the team 
financially (as was already customary in other countries). Maccabi on its part realized that 
there were no alternatives. In the absence of a real competitive leverage it had no choice but 
to allow the broadcastings free of charge. And so, during the years of its monopoly, Channel 
1 obtained an exploitive rent side by side with the composite rent it shared with the team. 
4.4 After 1990: Interdependence in the multi-channel period 
At the beginning of the 1990s the global communication revolution reached Israel, and the 
long lasting monopoly of the Public Channel was finally broken. The change began with the 
successful ingress of cable television in 1990. Most Israeli television viewers were for the 
first time given a chance to choose between various channels. The revolution continued in 
1993, when, for the first time, a general commercial channel, Channel 2, joined the television 
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market. Within a short time, the ratings of the new lively Channel 2 far surpassed those of 
the old and jaded Channel 1 (Zuckerman 1999). During the following years, the Israeli 
television market continued to widen. Many additional cable channels, satellite broadcasts 
and a new general commercial channel (Channel 10) joined the competition. 
The communication revolution has marked a new era in the broadcasting of sports events in 
Israel. In 1990 Channel 1 was the sole customer for the product of sports competitions in a 
market of many suppliers. With the launching of cable television, the television market 
opened to competition. One of the cables' pivotal channels was the Sports Channel, which 
soon demanded quality sports material. The launching of the Sports Channel brought both a 
quantitative (much more sport was now broadcast) and a qualitative (the broadcastings 
became much more professional) revolution to Israeli televised sports. Channel 1 found 
itself competing for contents that up to now had been free or almost free of charge, if only it 
chose to broadcast them. One by one it lost the broadcasting franchises of the central sports 
events: the Major soccer and basketball leagues, European soccer leagues, and the America 
basketball league (the NBA). One of the main assets to which Channel 1 chose to cling at all 
costs was the European matches of Maccabi Tel-Aviv’s Basketball Club. 
A number of factors drove the continuance of the relationship between the two sides. 
Maccabi Tel-Aviv on its part saw Channel 1 as a home. The team’s managers viewed the 
alliance between the “national team” and the “national channel” as natural. Moreover, the 
team has always won great respect from Channel 1. The broadcasters and commentators of 
the games identified with the team, supported it avowedly, and refrained almost completely 
from criticism. The channel also considered the team’s scheduling preferences, and the 
games were mostly scheduled for prime time broadcast slots. Furthermore, the long years of 
symbiotic interdependence between the two organizations facilitated the evolution of 
emotional relations. Still, the main consideration behind the team’s decision to maintain the 
relation was by now a financial one. In an interview with the Israeli journal ‘Status’, in 1992, 
Shimon Mizrahi, Maccabi’s chairmen, stated that the team had agreed to grant Channel 1 a 
broadcasting franchise for one year only, in order to retain a maneuvering potential when 
additional channels were launched (this was just before Channel 2 was launched). In an 
increasingly competitive television market Channel 1 was forced to substantially raise its 
compensations in order to retain the broadcasting franchise. 
Despite its growing financial stringency Channel 1 was willing to increase the payments in 
order to maintain an asset that it viewed as a national symbol. With the emergence of the 
new commercial channels, Channel 1 faced growing difficulties in determining its place and 
duties in a multi-channel environment (Zuckerman 1999). Its managers saw the 
broadcasting of Maccabi Tel-Aviv’s European matches as a symbol for the duties the 
channel should now fulfill. This perception is well articulated in the response of Channel 1’s 
speaker, Yuval Ganur, to criticisms over the channel’s massive payments to the team: 
Maccabi Tel-Aviv is Israel’s most successful team. Therefore, its natural home is 
Channel 1. There is nothing we can do about the insane sums we have to pay for the 
broadcastings. (Ynet, July 10, 2001; emphasis mine) 
The criticism over the large payments Channel 1 transferred to Maccabi grew stronger at the 
beginning of the new millennium. Following a decade during which Maccabi Tel-Aviv did 
not enjoy a remarkable success in the premier European league, the team improved and 
www.intechopen.com
 
Sociological Landscape – Theories, Realities and Trends 
 
350 
regained its position among the European elite. Since 2000 it reached the final stages of the 
European league (the final four) eight times, and won the European cup three times. 
Following this success Maccabi demanded a substantial increase in the payments for its 
broadcasting franchise. Channel 1 complied, and in 2001 the channel and the team reached 
an agreement promising the team 14 million dollars for two years (Ynet, July 3, 2001). It 
should be noted that only three years earlier Channel 1 had paid only half a million dollars 
for the same yearly franchise (Maariv, May 25, 2001). The agreement received intense public 
criticism. Critics claimed that “these payments are far too large for a public sponsored 
channel” (Ynet, July 10, 2001). When the criticism grew stronger and reached the parliament, 
Channel 1 withdrew from the original contract and limited the new one to only one year, in 
which it paid the team 6.75 million dollars.  
Maccabi’s chairmen, Shimon Mizrahi, quickly responded: “I’m glad. Next year a third 
commercial channel is entering the competition [Channel 10], and it will probably wish to 
acquire some high potential assets. Who knows what I will ask for then” (Maariv, July 27, 
2001). In a later interview Mizrahi added: “What are the ratings of Channel 1 anyway? What 
do they have except for Maccabi Tel-Aviv’s broadcasts? After 32 years during which 
Maccabi marched hand in hand with Channel 1, there should be other ways of doing things” 
(Ynet, February 13, 2002). Mizrahi’s words shed light on the way in which he was the 
interdependence between the team and Channel 1 in the beginning of the new millennium. In 
light of the television market’s expansion and the team’s European success, tradition and 
reputation, Mizrahi now saw the team’s dependence on Channel 1 as quite minor, while the 
channel’s dependence on the team was perceived to be very high. This perceived power of the 
team vis-à-vis Channel 1 has turned the tables. Instead of Channel 1 enjoying an exploitive 
rent together with the composite rent it was now the team that enjoys both worlds. 
In 2002 another new player entered the picture, the commercial Channel 10. Following a 
slow start, the channel looked for ways to break into the Israeli television market and 
bought the franchise for Maccabi’s European matches for 4.5 million dollars. Channel 1, 
suffering from financial difficulties and heavily criticized for its moves, could not compete 
with the offer, and so, for only the second time in almost 40 years, Maccabi Tel-Aviv’s 
European games were broadcast on another channel. But the broadcasts on Channel 10 were 
unsuccessful. The ratings were relatively low and Channel 10 did not manage to use the 
broadcasts as leverage to reach wider audiences (Yediot Ahronot, July 14, 2003). The 
combination between a less attractive Maccabi team in the 2002-2003 Season and a new and 
unfamiliar channel in a saturated television market drove the new alliance to failure. 
This failure crystallizes the fragile nature of inter-organizational symbiosis. Once the 
delicate relationship that was built up for decades had been shattered, both sides suffered. 
Romo and Schwartz (1995) report a very similar chain of events in their study on the 
migration of manufacturing plants in Long Island, New York. The authors found that core 
industries, which had the upper hand in the local economy and moved to another place 
with a better cost structure, discovered following the move that the symbiosis (which in that 
case took the form of an innovative dynamic) was gone. Even though the new deals 
significantly reduced supplier costs, they came with a substantial price—the loss of 
symbiotic rent. Hence, the symbiotic benefits of an alliance coexist with the exploitative 
practices described above. This complex relationship can not be simplistically characterized 
as either just symbiosis or only exploitation. 
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Recognizing the failure of the alliance, Channel 10 and Maccabi untied the pact after only 
one year. Channel 1 was delighted to jump on the wagon, and in July 2003 it regained the 
yearly broadcasting franchise for Maccabi’s European matches, this time for only three 
million dollars. This lower payment (less than half of what the channel had paid only two 
years earlier) was largely driven by the deep economic recession of those years. However, 
the new agreement still drew wide public criticism. To put things in perspective, the 
channel’s entire budget for dramas and documentaries during that year was less than two 
million dollars. The critics claimed that a bankrupting public channel should not fund a 
professional team, and that the money could have been better spent (Haaretz, July 31, 2003). 
Josef Bar’el, Channel 1’s general manager, replied to the critics: 
There are only two worthy sports events: The Israeli premier soccer league and Maccabi 
Tel-Aviv in Europe. Every Israeli household is entitled to watch these events free of 
charge. It was a fatal mistake on the part of Channel 1 to give up these broadcasts. . . . 
Beyond the public importance of Maccabi’s games, I personally have a nostalgic relation 
to the team. I played there in my youth and the team for me is a symbol of Zionism; a 
national symbol. This is why I think the acquisition is necessary. (Haaretz, July 28, 2003; 
emphasis mine)  
Bar’el’s statement was later echoed by other members of Channel 1’s board of directors 
(many of whom were political nominations and avowed Maccabi’s fans). The words 
visualize the channel’s perception of the team’s matches as an event of special importance. 
In these games lies the nation’s spirit; broadcasting them on the national channel is the way 
to sustain this spirit and the channel’s national relevance. The team itself is of course more 
than happy to play along with the national terminology. Maccabi’s managers often present 
its success as a national mission, which must be supported by the public. In reply to the 
growing criticism over the Public Channel’s high payments they stated that “agreements 
must be met. No one forced Channel 1, or anyone else for that matter, to sign these 
agreements.” (Haaretz, September 28, 2005) 
At least on face value the team was right, and the payments for the franchise were all a 
matter of supply and demand. However, one must remember that both Israeli commercial 
channels gave up the franchise for the games only one year after they acquired it. This fact 
raises questions regarding the amount of competition for the broadcasting franchise. Why 
was Channel 1 willing to still pay such high amounts (about 4 million dollars in 2007)? Part 
of the answer lied in the channel’s perception that in its hectic state of affairs Maccabi’s 
matches were among the few broadcasts that still justify its existence and provide it with 
legitimacy. This approach was expressed in the words of the channel’s temporary 
chairwoman, Gabriela Shalev: “This is one of the things that may allow us to sustain the 
public broadcasting; it attracts viewers.” (Haaretz, May 9, 2006) Alex Giladi, the vice 
president of NBC, a leading figure in Israeli sport, and one of the initiators of the 
relationship between the Public Channel and Maccabi Tel-Aviv agrees. Following the 
decision of Channel 1 to stop broadcasting the team’s European matches in 2007 he claimed 
that “Maccabi will survive the break, but this may be the beginning of the end for Channel 
1.” (Ynet, April 13, 2007) 
In conclusion, the end of Channel 1’s monopoly in the Israeli television market brought a 
dramatic change to the interdependence between the channel and Maccabi Tel-Aviv. 
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Whereas during the monopolistic era the team depended on the channel completely and 
was forced to give up any demand for significant compensations, the tables have now 
turned. In the post-monopolistic era Channel 1’s dependence on the team became immense. 
As a result, the team could demand that the channel compensate it generously, regardless of 
the channel’s grave economic condition and the mild market demand for the games. 
5. Summary and discussion 
This paper explored the interdependence between sports and media organizations by 
looking at the long lasting interdependence between Maccabi Tel-Aviv Basketball Club and 
the Israeli Public Channel. Benassi (1995), who examined organizational strategic alliances, 
criticizes the common view of these alliances as a provisional phenomenon, motivated 
primarily by financial considerations. He believes that strategic alliances are quite often a 
long-lasting phenomenon, used for various reasons other than financial ones. The 
interdependence between Maccabi Tel-Aviv and Channel 1 demonstrates this contention. 
The two organizations have been cooperating closely for almost 40 years, in a relationship 
which has been supplying both sides with various advantages in their respective markets. 
Hence, the alliance carried a strong symbiotic dimension, providing both sides with 
significant composite rent. 
However, this symbiotic interdependence has often been accompanied by exploitive 
elements and behaviors. These exploitive elements have altered throughout the years, as the 
Public Channel lost its advantageous structural position and power relations shifted. In the 
monopolistic television era Maccabi Tel-Aviv used the broadcasts to attain higher revenues 
(mostly indirect ones) and establish its position as the “national” team, while for Channel 1 
the broadcasts were a source of high ratings and national legitimacy. Nevertheless, Channel 
1 clearly possessed more power in the relations, a fact that allowed it to avoid franchise 
royalties almost completely and achieve an exploitive rent. 
In 1990 the tables have turned and Maccabi Tel-Aviv took the upper hand in the 
relationship. With the ingress of other players into the Israeli television market, the team’s 
dependence on Channel 1 dropped dramatically, while the channel’s dependence increased. 
Maccabi used this change to demand (and receive) extremely high royalties from Channel 1, 
which had lost all leverage for negotiation. The team’s managers saw this as a fair and 
reasonable compensation for the many years in which the games were broadcast free of 
charge. In other words, the exploitation of the 1970s and 1980s was now rewarded by 
counter-exploitation, as the team rather than the channel began to enjoy exploitive rent. 
The Israeli case serves as a classic example of the complex relations between sports 
organizations and media organizations. These relations are largely ones of symbiotic 
interdependence and composite rent. Media and Sports organizations often have mutual 
dependency in their efforts to maintain their status and power in popular Western culture. 
But alongside the composite rent earned from this cooperation, there are also power 
relations involved. When one organization is highly dependent on the other, it gives the 
latter a superior position, which will most likely be used to acquire exploitive rent. 
This pattern is also well demonstrated in American sports. James Quirk and Rodney Fort 
(1999) examine the relations between the large professional sports leagues (the, NFL, MLB, 
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NBA, and NHL) and American media. Similarly to previous research (e.g. Wenner 1989; 
Lever & Wheeler 1993; Koppett 1994; Williams 1994; Weingerten 2003) they talk about the 
symbiotic dimensions of this relationship and the mutual gains for both sports and media 
organizations in terms of revenues, popularity, and legitimacy. Yet, Quirk and Fort also 
notice the changing nature of power relations and exploitation, which have characterized 
the sports-media relationship along the years. 
One prominent example comes from American Football. Until 1962, the National Football 
League (NFL) was operating under a court injunction, forbidding it from signing a league-
wide national TV contract. The fourteen teams had to separately negotiate and sign their TV 
contracts, and the TV networks used this to avoid high payments. When a new bill 
exempting league-wide television contracts from antitrust prosecution passed in 1962, the 
NFL became the sole negotiator of TV broadcasting rights. Consequently, the total TV 
income of all NFL teams rose sharply, from $3.5 million in 1961 to $16.2 million in 1964. 
While this initial increase may be explained with the underpayments by TV networks prior 
to the 1962 bill, broadcasting rights contracts have continued to increase dramatically ever 
since. By the end of the 1990s, the NFL, a monopoly in its field, has demanded (and 
received) TV contracts in the sum of more than two billion dollars per year. The national TV 
networks (CBS, NBC, ABC, Fox), however, all suffer from this monopolistic market. They all 
report enormous losses on their NFL contracts. The highly competitive environment and the 
fact that there is only one product to fight for, lead, according to Quirk and Fort, to excessive 
biddings, which are exploited by the NFL to acquire what I termed here an exploitive rent. 
Quirk and Fort further examine the relationships between the major leagues and other 
prominent actors in their environment: fans, unions, players and cities. Once again, they 
show how these relationships provide the parties involved with a synergetic composite rent. 
For example, cities which host a successful professional sport franchise acquire reputation 
and publicity, while also providing their residents with a source of entertainment and local 
identification. Franchises, on their part, enjoy financial support, devoted fans, and new 
expensive sports stadiums, established and funded by taxpayers.  
However, Quirk and Fort also demonstrate the exploitative dimension of this relationship. 
They contend that during the years, with ample support from the US government, the major 
leagues gradually turned into monopolies in their respective fields. With monopoly came 
enormous power, which the leagues now use to exploit and manipulate smaller cities. These 
smaller cities often see the sport team as a necessary resource for maintaining local 
reputation, and are therefore willing to do almost anything to retain the franchise. Under the 
threat of uprooting to another city and market, the franchises use their monopolistic power 
to demand conditions that would promise increased revenues, while imposing crushing 
financial hardships on cities that are already strapped with debt. Most notably, team owners 
demand that the cities provide publicly financed stadiums and arenas, or else the team 
would move to another city. 
I argue that this combination of symbiosis/exploitation is not unique to the media and 
sports nexus or to the sports field in general. Rather, it is a common part of organizational 
interdependencies, which are seldom simplex. Organizational interrelations are often 
characterized by symbiotic interdependence, where cooperation and trust exist, and both 
sides share a composite rent. This pattern, however, exists side by side with some degree of 
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exploitive relations, where one of the sides, or both, attempt to maximize their returns by 
taking advantage of the other side’s structural dependency. It seems that the simultaneous 
existence of both symbiosis and exploitation is the rule rather than the exception of 
organizational interdependence. Moreover, organizational interdependence is volatile and 
dynamic. Changes in the organizational environment and context often alter organizational 
relations, leading to changes in the balance between symbiosis and exploitation. Thus, the 
side which gained an exploitive rent at one point in time could very well be the exploited 
one later on. Once again, power is not a fixed part of the social structure. Rather, power 
relations are volatile, and are highly sensitive to transformations in the environmental 
context. 
Finally, it seems that one of the main dilemmas organizations face is the need to settle the 
constant inherent tension between the stated cooperative and symbiotic relationship, and 
the often unequal and exploitive distribution of returns de facto. If one side perceives the 
other as exploitative and abusing, it may lose the trust which is so crucial to the preservation 
of cooperation. Therefore, in order to maintain the cooperative relationship both sides must 
perceive their composite rent as more substantial than the other’s exploitive rent, or at least 
as substantial enough. Such a perception is often achieved through camouflaging the 
exploitive dimension of the relationship by creating narratives that emphasize coexistence 
and mutual gains (White 1992). Through these narratives both sides may preserve the 
perception of their interdependence as mutually beneficial and contributory.  This narrative 
solution emphasizes the strength of the composite rent idea. As Burt (1992) argues, 
organizational relations are characterized by constant exploitation. But as long as both sides 
maintain revenues that exceed what they would have made acting separately, the 
cooperation remains expedient, and is likely to be justified by both. 
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